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FOREWORD
This document constitutes the final report of the Fly-By-Light/Power-By-Wire
(FBL/PBW) Integrated Requirements Analysis and Preliminary Design study,
contract NASl-19360, Task 52.
The NASA technical representative for this task was Charles W. Meissner, Jr.
The work was accomplished by Avionics/Flight Systems personnel of the Boeing
Commercial Airplane Group.
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1.0 SUMMARY
HIRF related incidents on commercial transport airplanes are in contrast with HIRF
requirements being proposed by regulatory agencies. This is the result of the
inconsistent combination of factors that are used to describe aircraft HIRF protection.
These factors include the external HIRF environment, the external to internal airframe
attenuation, the internal RF field description, and equipment susceptibility or
qualification levels and waveforms. An effort to describe and resolve these
inconsistencies has been performed as Task 52 under NASA contract NAS1-19360.
Prior to assessing each of these factors, the overall HIRF certification process for
critical flight equipment and systems as described in the section 8 of the draft HIRF
Users Manual is compared with the certification process as completed by an airplane
manufacturer. Notable differences make aspects of the ideal viewpoint incompatible
with the realistic route to compliance. Idealized certification develops as a linear
process and incorporates a recursive loop at the end of a program to incorporate
corrective measures for possibly non-compliant equipment and systems. The realistic
route to compliance develops as a set of parallel processes during the life of a new
airplane program, and recursive corrective sequences are avoided because of the cost
and delay they incur. Negotiations and cooperative efforts among suppliers, airframe
manufacturers, and regulatory agencies are actively conducted by various liaisons to
expedite equipment qualification. Incorporation of aspects of the realistic process into
the idealized process is recommended.
The means of arriving at an external environment definition is based on a worst case
scenario outlook tending to drive requirements to impractical levels. Alternative
approaches to assessing the environment including the details of transmitter antenna
and airplane approach geometry coupled with probability models may provide a more
realistic evaluation of the threat.
Determining aircraft attenuation to HIRF and the properties of the internal environment
requires both analytical and test methods currently applied to aircraft coupling and the
internal environment. No currently available single test method or analytical tool is
practical or applicable over the full HIRF threat frequency spectrum. Regarding
modeling techniques, deterministic methodologies are important in the lower frequency
range, e.g. below 200 MHz, whereas statistical models are more appropriate at higher
frequencies where field variability obviates a deterministic approach.
Test methods similarly must be regarded as dependent upon sensor location and the
frequency range of appl!cability. It is suggested that mode-stirring and wide band
gaussian noise methods are suitable above 400 MHz and in many airframe cavities;
however, the conventional low level swept frequency techniques are applicable at lower
frequencies and/or constricted geometries.
It is recommended that statistical methods be used to assess the highly variable cavity
fields and to correlate frequency and spatial averaging procedures at higher
frequencies. These techniques are essential for the interpretation of mode-stirred and
swept frequency data bases.
The final section focuses on equipment susceptibility test methods and the analytical
and test methodologies used to probe the airplane internal fields. Bench level tests
begin early in an airplane program when requirements are initially set. System level
tests tend to be expensive and performed late in an airplane program on integrated
qualified components. As such they are for the present time considered to be of lower
priority to bench level equipment tests.
Modeling of screen room and of airframe internal fields remains rudimentary. Statistical
and mode-stirred approaches can in principle be designed to incorporate similarity
concepts relating the screen room test environment to aircraft internal fields. Antenna
correction factors determined from field measurements for these environments indicate
that the sensor response to the internal fields in complex airframe cavities tends to be
isotropic at the higher frequencies, an empirically validated conclusion.
Instituting the conclusions and recommendations proposed in this document to the
modification of current certification processes will do much to provide a more consistent
approach than presently exists.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
Evaluating commercial transport aircraft response to high intensity radiated fields
(HIRF) has become an issue of importance with the advent of aircraft comprised of
composite/plastic material structures and electrically controlled critical flight systems
and components. Methodologies for assessing aircraft vulnerability to HIRF have had
an impact on the certification process. Nonetheless, the HIRF compliance process
development has also incorporated elements based on historical and other non-
technical criteria that have heretofore lead to a certification process tending to be
burdensome to the airplane manufacturer, technically inaccessible to regulators, and
embodying factors lacking an overall mutual consistency. It is the purpose of the
following document to address these issues, not to resolve them in their considerable
complexity, but to provide a framework from which a consistent certification process
may evolve. Much of the underlying structure now exists from which this evolution can
proceed, but a coherent picture is lacking. It is a major objective of the following to
provide such a perspective and thereby establish HIRF certification on a more rational
basis than presently exists.
2.1 Background
A problem associated with the certification of airplanes to HIRF is illustrated in Figure
2-1. There exists a credibility gap between HIRF design effectiveness as determined
from current assessment methods in contrast with HIRF incidents recorded in
commercial airplane service history. A recent NASA publication [1] addresses many
HIRF incidents that have occurred. Scrutiny of the document indicates that HIRF
incidents in commercial transport aircraft are largely anecdotal, thereby raising
uestions as to the reality of the threat. This is not to ignore there have been serious
IRF related incidents, but these have been exclusive to military aircraft and
helicopters. A source of the discontinuity between methodology and reality has been
identified with the inconsistent combination of factors determining aircraft susceptibility
to HIRF. In other words, it is clear that HIRF incidents are possible, but the conditions
and probability for their occurrence have yet to be satisfactorily categorized.
This situation applies to current and future design and certification of new conventional
aircraft, modifications to existing aircraft, and new innovative aircraft, such as the High
Speed Civil Transport.
Aircraft HIRF protection design and certification has been based on specifying an
external RF environment [2,3], assessing the internal airframe and installation
attenuation of the environment, and then designing and testing equipment and systems
to function in the internal environme-nt[4]i While this approach is straight forward
conceptually, the details of the process become complex and may drive the airframe,
installation and equipment design to unrealistically high levels of conservatism.
The details that make this process complex include:
ao The external environment has several definitions, such as peak, average,
peak rms, certification, normal, and all of these vary by frequency band.
b. The airframe attenuation is influenced by airframe structure, installed
systems, cavity resonances, field incidence angle, and field exposure
time.
C, Equipment and system susceptibility test results are sensitive to the
choice of test method (anechoic chamber versus mode-stirred chamber
[5], preset field strengths, monitored and leveled field strengths),
equipment test configuration, modulation and time of exposure.
The approach to dealing with these variables has a significant impact on the airframe
HIRF protection design requirements, the method of verifying the protection adequacy,
and the format of the data used to certify the protection margins.
Since there are different groups and organizations that define and influence each of
these areas, the overall protection design and certification must often deal with
inconsistent data with which to base design decisions or certification plans, These
inconsistencies may lead to insufficient HIRF protection, over;design, or unne_¢e_s,_ry
aircraft-level tests to verify protection perfc_rmaric-e.
2.2 Problem
Implementation of aircraft HIRF protection and subsequent regulatory certification
requires assessment of the four factors delineated in Figure 2-2, including:
a. The external HIRF environment,
b. the external to internal airframe attenuation,
c. the internal RF field description, and
d. equipment susceptibility or qualification levels and waveforms.
The combination of these factors determine the overall protection effectiveness.
Currently, each factor has an accepted convention for its description, but these
conventions are not necessarily consistent when the overall protection design
effectiveness is assessed.
Each factor requires a fairly complex description. For example, the severe external
HIRF environment is a composite of a number of RF emitters [2,3], with the emitter
having the highest intensity fields selected to represent the field strength for a
particular frequency band. At high frequencies, the airframe supports a large number
of airframe, wiring, and cavity resonances, which suggests a statistical representation
[6-11] of the attenuation may be most technically correct. At VHF and UHF i
frequencies, the attenuation may be dominated by specific wiring and airframe ....
resonances, which may not support a statistical assessment. .........
Similarly, equipment and systems may be tested in mode-stirred test facilities [12,13],
or in semi-anechoic chambers [14]. Equipment susceptibility test levels must be
comparable between these two different methods, taking into account room and test
bench effects associated with the two methods.
Assessing the aircraft HIRF protection margin does not follow by simply arithmetically
summing all factors for a particular frequency. Any statistical assessment must provide
a rational method to represent the overall aircraft protection, both for determining the
4
aircraft design requirements and for verifying the HIRF protection margins for aircraft
certification.
2.3 Objective
The overallobjective of Task 52 to NASA Contract NAS1-19360 has been to propose
activities leading to a consistent approach for expressing HIRF airframe protection
margins, to support aircraft design decision and aircraft certification. Methods for
describing the factors associated with aircraft HIRF interaction are needed, so that the
resulting HIRF protection margins realistically describe protection performance. This
means that each individual HIRF protection factor, such as RF environment description
or equipment susceptibility, will be expressed in terms that are technically consistent.
This is not only as individual factors, but also in relation to the other HIRF protection
factors.
2.4 Scope
Each factor identified in this report is sufficiently complex to require a separate study in
its own right. Therefore the scope of the following work is limited to discussing those
issues that drive the current certification process (i.e., external and internal
environment, equipment and airframe attenuation test methods) and which heretofore
have been based on incongruent assumptions. These assumptions will be identified
and discussed in detail as will the consequences of current technical approaches in
assessing the HIRF threat. Suggested alternatives will be proposed, e.g. statistical
assessments, about which it will be argued a HIRF certification process can be
developed that reflects a consistent overall approach for describing aircraft HIRF
protection effectiveness.
2.5 Approach
Figure 2-3 outlines the Task with respect to its constituent elements. The diagram
implies that each element is related and a consistent certification process will be
arrived at when each of these elements is addressed and integrated into an overall
process definition.
Section 3.0 compares the airplane certification process as viewed from the idealized
perspective of the SAE-AE4R Users Manual for AC 20-xx with the realistic process as
perceived to evolve during a new airplane development program from the point of view
of one airplane manufacturer. The ideal process will be seen to differ with the realistic
process and potentially may in fact drive airplane production to non-competitive levels.
It is recommended that elements of the realistic process be incorporated into the ideal
process so as to reflect actual airplane development and certification.
Section 4.0 considers the external environment and its impact on other factors. The
external environment reflects a worst case compilation of HIRF emitters throughout the
U.S. and Western Europe. Consequently, the environment has tended to be fixed at
rather high levels especially in frequencies above one GHz. Furthermore, there is not
as yet a unique choice for the environment, but the definition has tended to evolve over
time. Here are discussed the multiple definitions (severe, certification and normal,
peak and average) with a few comments pertaining to the probability of exposure to the
environment [15]. It should be emphasized that statistical and probabilistic concepts
\
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run a common thread throughout this document wherein it is proposed that this point of
analysis be given more credence in assessing HIRF test requirements.
Section 5.0 speaks to two important factors that are central to developing a consistent
certification process. Current methods of assessing the internal environment and the
airplane attenuation of the external field have led to several consistency issues. The
fields excited within the complex airframe cavities have been shown to be highly
variable as a function of frequency and spatial position. Furthermore, resonances are
set up in the cavity that both contribute to this variability and the difficulty in interpreting
the nature of the internal fields. For example, questions remain as to whether the
internal fields and associated attenuation be represented by the average or minimum
(worst case) attenuation, or should an alternative statistical description be given the
fields. Sensor properties within the cavity environment are ill defined in that antennas
may respond isotropically or retain some directionality within the cavity. In addition, an
airframe attenuation is defined once a suitable reference measurement has been
defined. This operation has not been standardized however and a consistent
attenuation definition is not possible until one has been established.
Section 6.0 addresses issues pertaining to equipment susceptibility test methods,
requirements and data. A consistent certification process is one in which laboratory
equipment tests can be related to the internal airplane environment, otherwise there is
the risk of designing equipment to unrealistic protection margins. Current FAA
equipment test requirements (100 or 200 v/m) are largely based on precedents set in
earlier (usually military specification) documentation, and on calculations founded on
assumptions about the shielding effectiveness of the airframe to the external
environment. As discussed above this is at present an ill-defined number which may
have at best a statistical significance. Furthermore, the relationship between tests
performed in anechoic versus reverberation chambers is not well defined with antenna
correction factors currently not agreed upon.
Section 7.0 will present the following conclusions:
Compounding worst case requirements in arriving at a certification process is not the
only means of arriving at requirements and is most likely not a realistic or even correct
approach.
The idealized process envisioned by regulators deviates significantly from the realistic
process as practiced by airframe manufacturers. It is recommended that aspects of the
realistic dynamics be incorporated into the process definition and flow.
Test and analysis provide a means to define the internal environment and relate
equipment level tests to the internal field. These results may be used to provide more
realistic requirements on equipment level testing.
Test and analysis methodologies are a function of test configuration and frequency. A
single attenuation assessment methodology is not sufficient for the entire airplane or
over the entire 10 kHz to 18 GHz threat range.
Each quantitative factor contributing to assessing the overall HIRF protection margin
may have a statistical element. For example, airplane attenuation as measured in the
flight deck is not represented by a single number but at the higher frequencies may be
defined by a distribution function which may be fairly well characterized. In suitably
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defined frequency ranges, assessing distributions for each factor and appropriately
convoluting these is a candidate method that may provide a more realistic picture of
HIRF susceptibility of airplane electronics and thereby lead to more realistic
requirements. Criteria delimiting statistical methods are yet to be determined.
TWO STORIES
CREDIBILITY GAP
Figure 2-i Aircraft Vulnerability to HIRF
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FACTORS DETERMINING MARGINS
Figure 2-2 Consistent Protection Margins
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I
AIRPLANE COUPLING AND INTERNAL
ENVIRONMENT
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TEST / ANALYSIS METHODS
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HIRF ENVIRONMENT DERNITION
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EQUIPMENT SUSCEPTIBILITY, TEST
METHODS, REQUIREMENTS, AND DATA
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Figure 2-3 Task 52 Elements
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3.0 AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION PROCESS
There exists a need for a realistic assessment of the commercial aircraft certification
process with respect to the HIRF environment. This section reflects the compliance
process for large transport airplanes integrated with information retrieved from HIRF
related documentation issued by industry and the regulatory agencies (FAA and JAA)
responsible for HIRF oversight and certification. It is written from one airframe
manufacturer's perspective, but is intended to be sufficiently generic to apply to
transport aircraft in general.
This section provides an overview of how in practice an airplane is certified for HIRF.
Certification is accomplished by examining: the identification of airplane critical
functions; the development and release of certification plans; the comparison, issue
and integration of FAA and JAA requirements; the assessment of supplier bench level
tests; the assessment of airplane level tests; the compilation and release of the
airplane HIRF certification document; and the final Type Certificate award. Many of
these tasks are interrelated and performed in parallel.
The objective of the following is to integrate experience gained in the development and
assembly of new generation aircraft into a representation of a consistent process
leading to the demonstration of compliance to HIRF certification requirements. A
comparison is made with the idealized process as detailed in section 8 of the SAE AC
20-xx Users Manual [3]. Such a comparison is essential to the development of a
consistent compliance process.
3.1 Idealized Process
Figure 3-1 is the flow schematic of the process used in airplane certification programs
to demonstrate compliance as proposed in the SAE Users Manual for AC 20-xx. These
steps are summarized in the following, details can be found in the User's manual. The
requirement for demonstration for any specific system or equipment installed in an
aircraft is related to the criticality of the function performed by the system/equipment.
The identification of systems/equipment functional criticality results from the application
of a Functional Hazard Analysis developed in accordance with AC 25.1309-1A or AMJ
No 25.1309. This analysis establishes Catastrophic, Hazardous/Severe Major and
Major failure categories which may be related to system/equipment for the purpose of
compliance demonstration .....
The certification level requirement is related to the failure condition category. Electrical
and electronic systems whose failure would cause or contribute to a failure function
resulting in catastrophic failure are defined as being at Level A certification level,
whereas those resulting in hazardous/severe-major failure condition are Level B, and
major failure condition are Level C. The User's Manual details criteria by which the
appropriate compliance level is chosen.
Referring to Figure 3-1, the initial step for new or existing equipment is to determine the
HIRF environment to which it is to be subjected. The HIRF environment so used is
dependent upon the criticality performed by the equipment. This establishes the test
level for the equipment test using procedures of ED-14/DO-160, Environmental
Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment, under section 20. The second
step is to make a decision as to which demonstration process can be used for
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compliance demonstration. The test requirement decision is then made based on the
criticality (Level A, B, or C) of the function of the equipment/system under evaluation.
In step 4 the test procedures of ED-14/DO-160C, Section 20 are used as a basis for the
qualification of electronic systems and equipment. Step 5 is relevant for equipment
performing Level A functions, for which further testing and evaluation at the system or
sub-system level may be beneficial. Physical installation of the equipment in the rig
assembly should be similar to that used in the aircraft.
Step 6 involves a decision as to test at the aircraft level. Systems performing Level A
functions (see step 11) are generally subject to aircraft testing. Procedures discussed
in section 5 are recognized to be practical and acceptable in the determination of data
for verification of aircraft and associated system installations. The two main
approaches to aircraft testing include low level coupling (options provided by steps 7, 8
and 9), and high level tests radiating the aircraft at levels equal to the Certification
HIRF environment (step 10). In the latter test, all systems performing Level A functions
should be fully operational and the aircraft placed in various simulated operating
modes.
Step 11 is an acceptable means of demonstrating compliance for systems performing
functions categorized as Level A but performing display or non-control functions only.
It cannot be used for Level A control functions. The objective of the test is to
demonstrate that when the aircraft is exposed up to the Certification environment, any
failures must not result in the loss of a Level A Display or Non-control function or the
display of hazardously misleading information. For functions categorized as Level B,
the test level to be used during equipment testing may be based on the Normal
environment with allowance made for aircraft attenuation using either aircraft
measurements or generic transfer function/attenuation curves. Lower level
requirements are stipulated for Level C testing.
Similarity and other methods including analysis are options available for certification,
but primarily for Levels B or C functions. Similarity cannot be used for Level A
functions.
Finally, the ideal process assesses the results of the selected option through an
electromagnetic evaluation (EMV) process (step 16) and a decision made to correct
non-compliant systems or to certify. A possible corrective measures Ioap (step 15) is
apparently a central aspect of the ideal process.
3.2 Realistic Process - -- =- -
Recent history pertaining to aircraft HIRF certification has provided a general • -
framework defining the route to compliance for future fly-by-wire/fly-by-light commercial
airplanes. The purpose of the following is to assemble and elaborate on disparate
elements of the certification process as it has historically evolved and thereby provide a
coherent picture of the aggregate process. The general stages and time line for aircraft
certification and HIRF certification specifically are represented in Figure 3-2 and
include:
1) Safety assessment process instituted. Airplane architecture (function
criticality, etc.) and electrical configuration are defined. These include
equipment and airframe design requirements.
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2) Level A (critical) systems are declared. The FAA/JAA may issue Special
Conditions, in this case regarding HIRF.
3)
4)
FANJAA and the airframe manufacturer coordinate requirements.
A certification plan is provided by the airframe manufacturer.
5) Tests are performed to demonstrate compliance:
Equipment (bench) Level Tests: Performance and pass/fail requirements
set. Suppliers perform equipment level HIRF qualification tests.
Airplane Level Tests: The airframe manufacturer performs
system/airplane level tests.
6) The manufacturer reports to regulatory agencies throughout the program
as part of the certification process definition.
7) Final documentation including analysis, test, and certification reports are
compiled and submitted to the regulatory agencies.
8) Compliance is complete when certification requirements have been met.
Not discussed above are possible post-certification changes and tests which have
Some historical precedents in the certification process.
FAA and JAA compliance options run concurrently and requirements differ. Typically
aircraft manufacturers have maintained consistency by performing tests that satisfy the
most demanding set of requirements which repeatedly have been levied by the JAA.
Negotiations between the JAAJFAA and industry regarding a uniform set of
requirements are in progress. Incorporating FAA and JAA compliance processes into
Figure 3-2 results in the expanded version Figure 3-3. Reference to Figure 3-3 will be
made in the following.
3.2.1 Initiate Airplane Program (Block 1)
Functional hazard assessment is performed. Aircraft architecture and electrical
configuration are defined. Preliminary electromagnetic susceptibility analysis and
models are assessed. Airplane engineering program go-ahead is given.
Electromagnetics staff is organized. A design requirements document is released. The
regulatory agencies are informed of proposals.
3.2.2 Critical Functions (Block 2)
Criticality of functions and equipment are determined by engineering groups
responsible for each system in a safety and functional performance assessment. Level
A, B, and C systems are determined in part by reference to rules provided in the FAA
advisory circular AC 25-1309-1A. Final agreement on Level A, B, and C systems takes
place after the assessment is complete and after the FAA has approved certification
plans. Working lists are supplied to the FAA and JAA to aid with a final agreement.
Applicable regulatory agencies may issue preliminary special conditions based on
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events reflecting aircraft vulnerability or general modification to airframe architecture.
The manufacturer comments on the special condition which in this case relates to
airplane electronics HIRF susceptibility. The special condition is released providing
airplane requirements to meet Federal Aviation Regulations, (FAR). Special conditions
supplement the existing FARs, thus providing additional airplane requirements.
3.2.3 Set Requirements (Block 3)
When new model airplanes are proposed, the manufacturer sets initial equipment
subsystem test levels to be used by suppliers. Test level requirements are
recommended based on preliminary model analysis, estimated airframe attenuation
and known electromagnetic test capabilities. For example, the peak external HIRF
environment may be as large as 6800 volts per meter over a given frequency interval,
whereas the typical upper limit test capability is 600 to 1000 volts per meter. Design,
pass-fail criteria, and test plans for early-on equipment level tests are negotiated with
suppliers and approved by the respective manufacturer/supplier liaison. EMC data and
in-service history are provided for off-the-shelf equipment. Nonetheless, any off-the-
shelf Level A, B, or C equipment is required to be qualified for HIRF. Negotiations
concerning requirements for items identified by the FAA/JAA are conducted between
the airframe manufacture and the FAA and JAA until a final version of these
requirements is agreed upon. Negotiations and reports are exchanged with regulatory
agencies in part through the agency of the Designated Engineering Representative
(DER). Furthermore, DERs often contribute pertinent information in these negotiations.
Those issues relating to airplane safety are deemed non-negotiable.
3.2.4 Certification Plans (Block 4)
Certification plans are submitted to the FAA and the JAA. Major features of a plan
include:. -_
1)
2)
3)
Unique features of the aircraft
Differences from previously certified aircraft
The methods for establishing compliance
4) A schedule of events.
FAA Requirements and Means to Compliance :
Currently two methods for compliance have been offered the FAA, including airplane
level tests (Method 1) or laboratory level tests (Method 2) on Level A system elements
and their associated wiring. The choice by the a rcraft manufacturer of Method 2 _ _
requires system components and their wire harness withstand an EM field strength in
excess of, e.g. 100 volts per meter, without the benefit of airplane structural shielding in
the frequency range of 10 kHz to 400 MHz, and e.q. 600 volts per meter between 400
MHz and 18 GHz. Figure 3-4 is a schematic of the FAA compliance process for
performing equipment qualification level testing.
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JAA Requirements and Means to Compliance
JAA verification requirements and means to compliance include both bench level
testing of Level A, B, or C equipment and airplane level tests. Bench level tests begin
as early in the program as possible, whereas airplane level tests must be performed
near or at program completion. Integrated systems comprised of qualified components
must pass any additional qualification tests. Typically, higher level integration tests
such as full aircraft tests, have simpler pass/fail criteria but are not straightforward to
perform.
Airplane level tests require that attenuation of the external environment during Low
Level Swept Continuous Wave (LLSCW) tests or Low Level Direct Drive (LLDD) tests
by the airframe demonstrate adequate shielding of Level A systems to the HIRF
environment. The test method of choice is to a large degree a function of the airframe
manufacturer. For high level pulsed tests, Level A system performance is monitored
and must show no adverse effect.
Figure 3-5 is a schematic of one view of the JAA Certification process in performing
both equipment and system level qualification tests, and airframe attenuation tests.
Significant differences exist in the compliance requirements and procedures on
comparing the FAA with the JAA. The JAA process tends to emphasize a worst case
scenario which is more burdensome on the manufacturer. It also subsumes the FAA
process in terms of equipment qualification levels (in addition to involving the airplane
level tests). By performing tests to JAA specifications, FAA requirements are
automatically satisfied. Nevertheless, test plans, reports and documentation and final
Certification Report, are separately written and filed.
3.2.5 Test and Analysis (Block 5)
Equipment Level Tests
Equipment or bench testing is performed throughout an aircraft program. The
manufacturer may perform tests on certain critical systems, e.g. flight controls, very
early in a program to assess equipment response to estimated HIRF levels. Level A, B0
or C systems are classified by the manufacturer and pass-fail criteria are defined by the
supplier and approved by the airframe manufacturer's equipment liaison. Test
procedures, design, verification goals, objectives and requirements are provided to
suppliers in the form of a EMI/HIRF requirements document. Suppliers provide test
plans and procedures which are then reviewed by the equipment liaison. Supplier tests
may be witnessed or alternatively, the manufacturer may conduct laboratory validation
tests. Equipment failure or deficiency requires re-design followed by re-test until
requirements are met. The manufacturer reviews and approves supplier test reports.
Supplier-manufacturer interaction is central to thecertification process as it is now
practiced. There is almost continuous supplier-manufacturer communication regarding
test requirements and verification test results negotiation which proceed until design
goals are met. Tests begin early-on in part because design goals and attendant
requirements may change in the course of the program.
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Airplane Level Tests
During several airplane developmental programs, low level swept frequency tests have
been performed on airframes or airframe testbeds. These tests served two purposes.
The aircraft attenuation tests were part of the certification process. Testbed tests also
served to develop test procedures and as engineering validation tests to assess
suitable low level test methods, evaluate airframe shielding techniques and associated
payoffs. Both swept frequency and mode-stirring techniques have been shown to be
acceptable methods for assessing airframe attenuation to low level incident fields.
Low level direct drive injection (LLDD) tests have been performed to measure internally
induced cable currents by externally injecting surface currents. The corresponding
transfer function provides an attenuation assessment. Low level direct drive (LLDD)
tests are performed between 10 kHz and 30 MHz, and low level swept continuous wave
(LLSCW), mode-stirred (LLMS), or frequency stirred tests are performed in the 30 MHz
to 18 GHz frequency range.
Pulsed high level tests have also been performed on production aircraft at isolated
frequencies to complete the certification process. Level A equipment must function
without adverse effect while the airframe is illuminated with the full threat level field at
specified frequencies. The preceding four options are available for airplane level
certification tests. One method is usually selected and performed near program
completion.
Alternative Certification Process
For selected equipment, e.g. second or third source engines, tests may be performed in
the laboratory with high level pulse fields suitably attenuated as determined by the
measured LLSCW levels. This reduces test cost particularly when modifications have
been made to the airplane equipment configuration.
Similarity and Analysis
The similarity option may be exercised on selected Level B and C equipment with
which there is documented experience, and in testing redundant or duplicate
equipment. Tests are performed on a single equipment model and the pass/fail
determination is accredited to equipment of the same type contingent on the response
of the tested component.
Analysis may be used in conjunction with test for example to relate skin currents to the
external field or to predict cable currents. Although difficult in practice, analysis may
also be used in place of test to assess Level B and C equipment immunity under pulse
level conditions.
Analysis and code development in general act to support protection design option
tradeoffs, test design and the interpretation of test results. There is an on-going
transfer of test data and analysis between test and model development impacting
airframe design on HIRF attenuation and HIRF test development.
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3.2.6 Manufacturer Regulatory Agency Interaction (Block 6)
Through the auspices of the DER, the manufacturer periodically apprises the FAA of
qualification test results as they are completed and documented by suppliers. The
manufacturer monitors supplier test methods and test reports. The airframe
manufacturer negotiates and incorporates regulatory agency input into the certification
process relating these to supplier test houses. Contrary to Figure 3-1, the realistic
process does not have a corrective measures feedback loop. Qualification tests and
any required re-design are performed by the supplier and manufacturer before
documentation is released and before airplane level testing is performed as implied by
the idealized process. In other words, once qualification tests have been satisfactorily
completed, the respective equipment is qualified. Regulatory agencies may witness
high level tests and review the corresponding documents.
3.2.7 Certification Documentation (Block 7)
The FAA certification documentation requires submittal of a criticality list, a HIRF
certification plan including schedule, and a final HIRF certification report. The latter
includes the necessary data appropriately summarized to substantiate qualification
levels and performance of Level A (critical) systems. Suppliers submit test plans and
test reports, the results of which are summarized in the final certification document.
Results are in part submitted via FAA Form 8110-3.
JAA documentation supporting compliance include a criticality list, an airplane level test
plan, interim milestone reports and summaries, and final reports summarizing tests
relevant to compliance.
3.2.8 Compliance (Block 8)
Certification is complete with the qualification of Level A, B, and C systems to
acceptable RF susceptibility/immunity levels as reported in the final certification
document.
3.3 Process Comparison
Figure 3-6 is a schematic representative of the general route to compliance based on
aircraft manufacturer experience and procedures compared with the ideal flow as
represented in Figure 3-1. The realistic process is consistent with regulatory agency
requirements and process recommendations. From this Figure, the following can be
ascertained:
1) The Realistic Process integrates all aspects of the routes to compliance
as inferred in the AC 20-xx. Catastrophic Level A, critical control, is
analogous to the manufacturer route as programmed to satisfy JAA
requirements, whereas Level A, critical display/critical non-control follows
the aircraft manufacturer plan for FAA compliance for all Level A systems.
However, as discussed above, these are in reality part of the same overall
process. Similarity and analysis are integrated into the certification
process and do not necessarily constitute separate routes to compliance.
On new airplane programs, similarity is a relatively insignificant option.
Possibly the most important observation is that the realistic process is not
a linear one as indicated by Figure 3-1. Once critical functionality has
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2)
3)
4)
been determined, qualification testing, analysis and subsequent
equipment certification are parallel processes.
Industry, supplier, and regulatory agency interaction is aChieVed through
industry liaisons such as the FAA Designated Engineering Representative
(DER). These individuals monitor test plans and results, participate in the
formulation of requirements, and communicate requirements between
regulators, designers, and suppliers. They are a very active element in
the certification process from the initial stages of aircraft development,
during the ongoing negotiation of compliance procedures and
requirements, to the final type certification issuance. The ideal process
apparently does not consider this or similar human dynamics that proceed
in the realistic process.
Equipment supplier and airframe manufacturer interaction is explicit in the
realistic process. Meeting design and regulatory requirements is
fundamental to test success and can be accomplished through close
supplier and manufacturer interaction. It is the responsibility of the
airplane manufacturer to act as a conduit to accurately communicate
manufacturer and regulatory agency requirements. Negotiations at this
level are ongoing and begin early in the certification process. Once
requirements are set, suppliers must meet qualification test levels. There
is no end of the program corrections loop for equipment that fails to meet
requirements as implied by the idealized process, although there is
limited historical precedence for post-certification design changes and
subsequent qualification test. A realistic certification process explicitly
accounts for post-certification processes.
Test methodology development is performed on a continuous basis during
the realistic certification process. Emerging technologies and scientific
breakthroughs may simplify test procedures or provide a more accurate
representation of the HIRF threat. An important component in the
process is model development and analysis which is most effective when
implemented in concert with test. New test and analysis technologies are
given more emphasis in the realistic process.
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Figure 3-1 Idealized Routes to Compliance
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4.0 EXTERNAL HIRF ENVIRONMENT
Assessing the external HIRF environment is a challenging albeit controversial
component of the HIRF certification process. As will be discussed below, a consistent
process has been lacking in part because of the approach in the determination of
representative external HIRF environment levels. In the past, setting these levels has
been a function of many factors including airplane type, regulatory agency approach,
and field level definition. Consequently the environment definition has not been unique
with respect to establishing HIRF protection and certification margins.
Furthermore, the external environment definition has been based on assumptions that
often lead to a worst case evaluation of the threat. The importance of this observation
lies in the fact that the environment, once fixed, drives the protection margins, and if
unrealistic, tends to drive airplane over design and cost. Current environment
definitions are fairly well established but their determination has been a matter of
historical evolution.
Nonetheless, aside from arguments as to the validity of the levels as a function of
frequency, as discussed in section 6, there are aspects of the defined threat that are
not consistent with airport operations and attendant airspace restrictions. The task that
follows is to point out these inconsistencies, their impact in the certification process,
and propose alternative approaches to assessing the HIRF threat.
4.1 Environment Definition
The HIRF external environment definition has evolved over a several year commitment
by the SAE AE4R and EUROCAE WG-33 committees, and the FAA, with inputs from
the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC), to compile the threat.
Details to the history and reasoning leading to the threat assessment are provided in
the HIRF User's Manual [3] section 4 and will be referenced in the following. Issues
related to the certification process pertain to the assumptions leading to environment
definition, the selection of the field levels (peak or average), and the uniformity of the
certification requirements definition.
There are upwards of 500,000 licensed HIRF transmitters in Western Europe and the
United States. Assessing the threat from the available data base is a significant task
although only a fraction of these HIRF sources are of consequential power levels. The
environment definition is divided between general and specific assumptions. The
(_eHneralassumptions provide an overall HIRF threat envelope across the 10 kHz to 40
z range as determined from the US and Western European transmitter power level
statistics, whereas the specific assumptions are based on aircraft to transmitter
distance criteria.
Figure 4-1 is a schematic showing the relationships between the general assumptions
made by the FAA and JAA that drive the composite HIRF envelope definition. A
detailed discussion justifying this set of assumptions is given in the Users Manual [3]
and will not be repeated here. it is important to point out that based on what are
considered safety issues, several of the assumptions are introduced on a worst case
scenario basis. In particular, the representative field strength for each band is chosen
to be that of the emitter with the maximum field strength (band drivers) for all
transmitters within that band. The envelope functions are the peak field strengths as
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determined from peak rms values, and the average field strengths as determined from
the average transmitted power.
Figure 4-2 relates how specific assumptions concerning transmitter target separation
contribute the environment assessment. The principal difference between the severe
and certification environment is that in the US, the FAA has introduced special use
areas (SUA's) which have been eliminated from the severe environment definition to
arrive at the certification environment. The normal environment is a lower level field
strength and is determined from field strengths in the airspace in and around airports in
which routine departure and arrival operations take place. Ultimately it is the latter two
environments that determine the aircraft systems and equipment certification test
levels. The JAA used the same data base but ascertained the environment from a
probability analysis of the airplane exposure from shipboard and ground based
transmitters close to airports. The assumptions in the analysis are not given in the
User's Manual nor are they published so that a critical assessment cannot be made.
The International Severe, Certification, and Normal HIRF Environments as presented in
Figures 4-3 to 4-5 are determined by combining the FAA and JAA environments.
Methods of assessing the environment by introducing additional factors that may
influence its determination are currently being examined. Among these factors are
included transmitter and antenna system losses particularly as reflected in field
strength calculations in the HF levels, antenna structure heights, exposure time,
incorporation of restricted airspace around some drivers, and checking airport driver
emitters to establish whether antennas are further than ground rule distances. Results
of this analysis are preliminary and are currently unavailable.
4.2 Environment Definition Impact on Aircraft Certification
Figure 4--6 represents the relationship between factors that drive the HIRF certification
process. There it is stressed that in the process, each of the factors is interrelated
except the environment definition which tends to drive the evaluation of the other
factors. A typical example is illustrated by Figures 4-7 and 4-8. Figure 4-7 compares
the HIRF certification environment with typical equipment susceptibility test levels. The
resulting airframe attenuation requirements given by the difference between the
environment and the test levels are shown in Figure 4-8. Since equipment qualification
test levels are necessarily chosen early in an airplane program development, and
airframe attenuation can at best only be approximately estimated, there is some risk in
not meeting attenuation requirements. A worst case assessment of the environment
therefore has a significant potential impact on HIRF assessment methods and design
requirements. This concept is illustrated by Figure 4-9 in which it is shown that the
protection margins are primarily driven by the relative shielding of the aircraft and
internal installation protection to the assessed environment. The choice of environment
definition and level, i.e. severe, certification, normal, peak or average, and how these
are to be applied to airframe attenuation, and equipment susceptibility assessments
has a major influence on test and design requirements. At the present time a uniform
definition is evolving making a consistent certification process problematic.
Another issue concerns the equipment test levels and equipment response properties
as a function of frequency. Below 400 MHz critical equipment are typically tested by
suppliers to, e.g. 100 v/m, which is higher than the environment definition even without
the benefit of airframe attenuation. The environment levels increase above 400 MHz
and in particular above 1 GHz. Test levels between 1 and 18 GHz typically are 600 to
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1000 v/m, therefore performance margins are a strong function of airframe attenuation
and internal installation protection. A lack of sufficient attenuation would imply HIRF
vulnerability and therefore impact airframe/equipment shielding design. It is an
interesting and possibly relevant observation that presently, most critical equipment
apparently are not affected by the high frequency fields above 1 GHz, at least at the
current 600 to 1000 vim test levels.
Furthermore, there is considerable engineering judgment in part based on airplane
service history and test experience leading to the conjecture that HIRF may not be a
factor at these higher frequencies and field levels, e.g. 6800 vim peak. Should this be
the case, there is the risk of setting excessive design goals based on either the peak or
average certification environment in the higher frequencies with respect to current
equipment design. It is essential to validate certain of the above assumptions for
example by testing equipment in chambers where sufficiently high field levels can be
attained at these frequencies. This is one method that may resolve the choice of
certification environment levels that in the contemporary context are worst-case driven.
Both the environment and equipment response are dynamic quantities that will change
in time and with new airplane programs and as the HIRF source data base expands
worldwide. A consistent process should be open to modifications based on up-to-date
technical information suitably analyzed to give a realistic HIRF threat.
4.3 Probability of Exposure
Assessing a realistic HIRF threat not only provides a basis for determining HIRF
protection margins, but is essential to developing a consistent HIRF certification
process that represents the airplane response to the HIRF environment. One
candidate method for assessing the threat other than the choice of a worst case
scenario, (or the addition of special use areas), includes probabilistic models for the
threat. This approach has not been adopted by the FAA, but has been employed by
the JAA in developing their representation of the HIRF environment. Unfortunately, the
assumptions that underlay the JAA models have not been available preventing a critical
evaluation of their results. Crucial to any statistical or probabilistic model is an
understanding of the assumptions that formulate the model, otherwise they are of little
or no value.
Such an approach has a precedent. A recent calculation [15], apparently used by the
JAA in its HIRF environment assessment, addresses the probability of aircraft and
transmitter separation. This function can be used to assess the probability of exposure
to various HIRF levels in the environment. The calculation is based on two concepts.
First, the geometric relationship between a transmitter and airplane position relative to
the runway is modeled. Secondly, the positions of the two are considered to be
independent random variables having empirically derived distributions. The airplane
position distribution function is determined from airport tracking flight path data for take-
off and landing at selected European airports. For the derived geometric relationship,
this distribution is found to be a normal variate. A similar procedure is used to
ascertain the distribution for HIRF transmitters within a fixed radius of the runway. The
probability of separation is then taken to be the product of these two normal
distributions (although a convolution of the two distributions may be the appropriate
procedure). It is further recognized that other factors may play a role in assessing the
vulnerability of aircraft in the HIRF environment which account for possible failure
modes. This remains to be analyzed.
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This model, while a first step in assessing the statistical aspects of the HIRF
environment, needs further development. First, it is prudent to expand the data base to
include flight path data and transmitter locations indicative of a larger sample. For
example, an alternative data base to assess airplane location in space and flight path
distributions near HIRF sources may be community noise tracking paths. Secondly, a
correlation analysis must be performed to assess the basic assumption of
independence. Conditional distributions accounting for possible dependence can then
be developed and provide a more rigorously determined assessment of the HIRF
external environment. For example, factors which impact the form of the distribution
such as time of exposure, and intensity variation, should be evaluated. These factors
are in turn based on empirically derived distributions. As argued above, it is crucial
that the basic hypotheses of any probabilistic model be clearly stated and tested to
provide a quantitative level of confidence in their predictive ability. Such a rigorously
determined probabilistic model does not currently exist.
Should an acceptable form be determined, its initial application may be to justify certain
test levels to demonstrate compliance with HIRF protection requirements for selected
equipment and systems, i.e. a factor in the HIRF analysis should be the probability of
exposure.
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5.0 AIRCRAFT COUPLING/INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
As discussed in section 4.2, HIRF aircraft attenuation requirements are based on worst
case external HIRF threat levels and equipment susceptibility test levels. A rational
basis for creating a consistent certification process requires several currently missing
elements. First a uniform definition of the HIRF environment should be provided and
as importantly, the probability of encountering this environment ascertained. Second,
equipment level susceptibility tests requirements should be determined that are
consistent with the aircraft internal HIRF environment. Standards should be revised to
depict requirements based on rigorous technical knowledge and judgment. This
requires a combination of deterministic and statistical analyses to assess the
component response to the highly variable fields excited within the aircraft by the
external HIRF environment. Finally, a consistent aircraft attenuation response may be
assessed by taking the ratio of an internal field measurement (statistically determined
where appropriate), with respect to an operationally defined external reference field
measurement.
Assessing the attenuation properties of an aircraft to the external HIRF environment
has become increasingly important with the advent of FBL/PBW aircraft and the
potentially vulnerable critical electronic systems. In addition, there is concern for
aircraft structurally conFigured with lower conductivity composite materials suggesting
reduction of the airframe shielding effectiveness. Investigating fields excited within
airframe cavities due to incident plane waves is a complicated problem to unravel.
Experience has shown that alternative test methods are required in different test article
configurations, and that a realistic HIRF assessment of an aircraft requires a
combination of test and analysis. It is the purpose of the following section to propose
how test and analysis may be used to provide a HIRF attenuation evaluation of an
aircraft.
Several factors contribute to the difficulty in evaluating internal aircraft coupling to the
external HIRF environment over the 10 kHz to 18 GHz certification frequency range.
While in principle full threat level testing of an aircraft can be performed, such tests are
expensive and performed long after aircraft completion thereby increasing the risk for
re-design and retrofit. Therefore, in the certification process, the airframe manufacturer
usually favors a combination of equipment bench level testing, low level swept
frequency (LLSCW) and low level direct drive (LLDD) tests to assess aircraft
vulnerability to the HIRF environment.
Furthermore, the structural complexity of the aircraft and its coupling to the test
environment mandate the development of analytical tools not only to optimize airframe
design with respect to HIRF protection but, along with test, to adequately evaluate the
response of the internal environment to the external threat. To correctly perform this
assessment, the assumptions made in performing equipment level susceptibility tests
should be consistent with those used in the test design for airframe level attenuation
evaluation. The current basis for setting requirements has lead to the development of
an overall process that tends to compound worst case requirements. For example,
there is evidence to suggest that aircraft flying through the HIRF environment expose
on-board electronics to a mode-stirred field distribution. Laboratory susceptibility tests,
on the other hand, are performed in fixed field level static configurations for which any
dynamic cavity response simulating for example aircraft motion in the HIRF
environment, is neglected. Consequently, it is incumbent on test and analysis to define
a functional relationship between equipment level testing and airframe attenuation tests
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that more realistically represents the coupling of the external to internal environment. A
consistent certification process may not be possible until this relationship is realized.
Section 5.1 of the following gives an overview of attempts to assess the field
attenuation by an airframe. Two principal test techniques, standard low level swept
continuous wave (LLSCW) and mode-stirring are compared in section 5.2. Between
400 MHz and 18 GHz, the mode density is sufficiently high to warrant a statistical
approach over the usual deterministic modeling of the fields excited in certain airframe
cavities. Section 5.3 discusses recent attempts to statistically model these fields,
whereas it is argued in section 5.4 that recent mode-stirring test results can be used to
assess these statistical models. Section 5.5 conveys a means by which appropriate
test and analysis may provide a rational basis for establishing HIRF protection margins
and protection performance.
5.1 Overview of Analytical Tools and Test Methods
Using low level fields to evaluate the attenuation of an airframe is based on the
assumption of linear scaling to a full threat level. The HIRF certification environment
increases dramatically above 400 MHz as does the excited mode density within aircraft
cavities. The combination of bench level testing and aircraft low level swept continuous
wave (LLSCW) testing is the preferred route to compliance. The following is a brief
overview of the predominant test and analysis methods currently used to assess
airframe attenuation and the attendant internal field response. These are provided to
reveal options that not only support design against the HIRF threat, but also give a
physically based rationale for establishing consistent requirements addressing HIRF.
Evaluating the many methods of HIRF analysis [16-18] indicates there is no single
methodology or HIRF code that adequately assesses airframe attenuation to HIRF
across the fult 10 kHz to 18 GHz frequency threat spectrum. Indeed, the complexity of
the HIRF and airframe interaction precludes using a single spatial point response
function to deterministically represent HIRF attenuation throughout the entire aircraft or
within an aircraft section over the full spectrum. The concept of a statistically based
HIRF assessment has not been fully integrated into analytical approaches currently
used to model HIRF response functions. A limitation of the deterministic approach is
particularly apparent in the difficulty of modeling efforts to adequately interpret the
variability of HIRF attenuation data and the high sensitivity to airframe configuration
and orientation. In addition, predicting airframe attenuation levels and attendant
coupling to internal cables and devices is computationally demanding and as yet very
approximate over certain threat frequency intervals.
A consistent HIRF certification process will be possible when analysis is sufficiently
sophisticated to correlate airframe attenuation in the HIRF environment to the
simulated HIRF test environment. FurtHermore, equipment level testing localized in the
laboratory can be reliably compared to the internal airframe level measurements only
when basic assumptions and test conditions are thoroughly analyzed and understood.
For example, equipment level tests for critical functions are performed in the antenna
near field at e.g. 100 volts/meter below 400 MHz and referenced to a near field
measurement within the reverberation or anechoic chamber, whereas airframe
attenuation tests are performed in the antenna far field, referenced to a calculated or
open field measurement. By open field is meant a measurement at the approximate
receive antenna position, but without the airplane in place. These two test scenarios
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are not consistent with the actual dynamic response that pervades an airplane exposed
to the HIRF environment.
It remains a challenge as to how to correctly relate the worst case HIRF certification
environment to the probability of equipment upset or damage as assessed from a
combination of bench level testing and calculated and/or measured airframe
attenuation. There is an apparent disconnect between present HIRF vulnerability
requirements and reality as illustrated by the fact that third generation aircraft are in
operation with fly-by-wire engine controls tested to 20 v/m, well below the HIRF threat
less some reasonable assumption for nacelle attenuation, yet no incidents have been
documented.
5.1.1 Analytical Tools Used to Assess HIRF Attenuation and Response
A number of analytical tools and computer codes are currently being applied in a
quantitative and qualitative evaluation of airframe cavity and cable response to HIRF.
Principal methods include those based on method of moments codes, transmission line
codes, finite difference time domain codes, finite element codes, analytically closed
form models, and probabilistic models.
Method of moments frequency domain codes are used in the wire grid modeling of
aircraft surfaces and cables. Their primary application to HIRF studies is to calculate
induced surface currents on the aircraft excited by an incident plane wave. Their
limitations are largely frequency dependent. The wire segments are required to be less
than a sixth of a wavelength making models exceedingly large and the computer
requirements excessive for high frequencies and sizable objects. The software is
restricted to conducting elements and cannot model dielectric structures. The upper
frequency limitation is determined by the length of one-sixth wavelength relative to
airplane dimensions or approximately 50 MHz for a large transport aircraft.
Frequency domain transmission line codes were for the most part originally developed
to study EMP and subsequently applied to evaluate lightning effects on aircraft. They
are used to model cable currents, through-braid couplings, electrically small apertures,
conductors and dielectrics, and in general any configuration where transmission line
analysis is valid.
Finite difference time domain (FDTD) codes have been developed to numerically solve
the Maxwell equations employing finite difference techniques. They incorporate
material properties and therefore are applicable to bodies comprised of conductors and
dielectrics of a variety of geometric configurations. FDTD models are capable of
modeling cable currents, cavity resonances including the effects of apertures, surface
currents, and the corresponding transfer functions. They are limited by requirements
on the finite difference cell size which must be less than a tenth of a wavelength along
a given Cartesian direction, and therefore can be demanding code to run in terms of
computer time and memory requirements. For a commercial aircraft, these
considerations currently limit the applicability of these codes to less than approximately
200 MHz.
Finite element modeling (FEM) with boundary integral (BI) or absorbing boundary
conditions (ABC) can be applied to HIRF studies to calculate induced surface currents
or internal fields of the aircraft excited by an incident plane wave. This method yields
either a large sparse matrix (FEM-ABC) or a combination of sparse and dense matrices
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(FEM-BI). In either case dielectric structures can be modeled. As with straight method
of moments techniques, this method is limited by relative wavelength to airplane
dimensions, or to frequencies less than 100 MHz for large transport aircraft.
Analytically closed form models solve the Maxwell equations in the frequency or time
domain within simple geometries such as rectangular, spherical, or cylindrical cavities.
Apertures can be included, as well as loss mechanisms and dielectrics by incorporating
an effective (phenomenologically determined) damping factor. These models provide
field distributions within a cavity excited by an incident plane wave, and can model
cavity resonances and cable currents. Models become computer intensive with the
increase in frequency, but can be easily run on PCs and workstations. Results to date
qualitatively match measured transfer functions from testbed tests.
Each of the above methods finds application over some well defined frequency range
and for geometric configurations representing an aspect of the airframe
electromagnetic field interaction. Nevertheless, they are deterministic and as currently
configured are limited in their ability to predict the highly variable fields that are
measured in the complex cavities occupied by aircraft electronics and critical systems.
This observation underscores the need to extend traditional analytical approaches by
incorporating probabilistic (or stochastic) arid Statlsticalmethods into the analysis of
HIRF data; the former to develop predictive tools based on probabilistic concepts, the
latter to better assess the highly variable HIRF test data sets and their relationship to
the HIRF environment. Statistical methods have been applied to airframe HIRF
attenuation data reduction and thereby assess the overall electromagnetic
characteristics of HIRF excited cavities. This will be discussed in detail below.
The above approaches each contribute to a better understanding of how the external
HIRF environment excites the internal fields produced at the local equipment level
surroundings. Analysis coupled with test may also impact present HIRF environment
assessment and result in more realistic HIRF certification requirements than the worst
case scenario now in place.
5.1.2 Test Methods used to Evaluate HIRF Aircraft Coupling
Test methods suffer from similar limitations ascribed to analytical methods discussed
above in assessing how the external HIRF environment correlates with the local
equipment level electromagnetic field environment. A reliable test methodology must
address the questions of data variability and sensitivity to test configuration referred to
above. To do so requires that the assumptions and conditions leading to given test
results be clearly delineated in addition to their linkage with analysis.
There are five principal methods of measuring the internal coupling of aircraft cavities
to externally impressed fields. These test methods have been applied over restricted
frequency ranges dependent on test equipment or test methodology limitations.
Included among candidate techniques are high level pulsed power tests, low level
swept continuous wave (LLSCW) tests, low level direct drive (LLDD) tests, low level
mode-stirring (LLMS) tests, and narrow band gaussian noise (frequency-stirred) tests.
A brief description of each method is given in the following, with a more detailed
account of the latter three provided in the subsequent section.
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Hi.qh Level Pulsed Power Tests
High level pulsed power tests are performed at fixed selected frequencies in the 400
MHz to 18 GHz frequency range. Equipment susceptibilities are monitored as the
aircraft is exposed to the full threat level fields from several directions. They are
expensive to conduct, the exposure area is small, current tests are performed at spot
frequencies, and the number of test facilities is limited.
Low Level Direct Drive (LLDD) Tests
Low level direct drive testing is normally performed between I0 kHz and up through
the first few airplane resonances, e.g. 30 MHz. The excitation is by current injection
onto the exterior fuselage. The external surface currents and the internal cable
currents are measured and the surface current to internal cable current transfer
function is evaluated. The surface current is calculated from the external field using a
method of moments code. Combining the measured and calculated transfer functions
determines the field to wire transfer function.
Low Level Swept Continuous Wave (LLSCW) Tests
The conventional method for assessing the attenuation characteristics of aircraft to
HIRF in the 200 MHz to 18 GHz range is the LLSCW test technique as represented in
Figure 5-1. The procedure is to first measure the electric field at a reference point in
space with the aircraft absent. The measurement is repeated with the aircraft in place
within the test site and the antenna positioned at the reference point within the
airframe, engine nacelle, or other component. The ratio of the measurements defines a
transfer function and a corresponding attenuation of the external field. Measurements
are typically performed over the 200 MHz to 18 GHz range partitioned into frequency
bands. The external transmit antenna is usually fixed in position as is the receive
antenna for a given test although both vertical and horizontal polarization responses
are measured. In practice electric fields are ordinarily measured. Magnetic field
measurements can be performed but are difficult above one GHz due to the paucity of
suitable receive sensors. Electric field measurements are position and polarization
sensitive and are highly variable as a function of frequency. Figure 5-2 is a typical
LLSCW flight deck measurement. Many of the peaks are interpreted as effective cavity
resonances due to overlapping cavity modes excited by the impressed field.
Composite Q factors associated with these resonances increase as the square root of
the frequency and ordinarily vary from as low as 10 or 20 below one GHz to over a
thousand above six GHz. Evaluating the importance of resonances is an unresolved
issue. Contemporary post processing techniques have focused on frequency
smoothing routines, spatial averaging, and spatial maxima envelope fits to deal with the
resonant structure and the associated data variability. However, there is not as yet an
agreed upon procedure to represent airframe attenuation.
Low Level Mode-Stirrin.q (LLMS) Tests
A recent addition to low level continuous wave test methodology is the adaptation of
mode-stirring for assessing aircraft attenuation to external fields. The test configuration
adapts reverberation chamber techniques to conform to the LLSCW methodology
previously discussed. Figure 5-3 is a schematic of one possible test scenario based on
the LLSCW test system suitably modified to accommodate mode-stirring software and
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controls. Alternative systems have been developed that use the peak-hold
characteristics of a spectrum analyzer to obtain attenuation data.
The principle of the method is to measure the fields at a fixed location in the cavity at a
fixed radiated frequency as the stirring paddle cycles through one revolution. The
paddle is designed to perturb the fields within the cavity so that during one revolution
all possible amplitudes and phases for excited modes pass though an arbitrary point in
the cavity, sufficiently separated from the conducting walls. The receive antenna
measures the cavity fields at equally spaced rotation angles of the paddle. From these
field levels and the measured reference field, the airplane attenuation is calculated.
The number of paddle positions required for acquiring data is suitably large to
statistically sample the fields. The peak, mean and minimum attenuation are calculated
at each frequency as well as other statistical measures of the cavity response.
Success criteria and test antenna configuration requirements are the same as those for
mode-stirred chambers. The response function becomes insensitive to receive
antenna polarization and position with the increase in frequency and attendant
increase in mode density. A typical cavity response is shown in Figure 5-4. Since the
response of the antenna within the cavity is approximately isotropic, reference
measurements are made with respect to a low directivity antenna and with ground
reflections averaged out to obtain a consistent attenuation factor.
A related technique [13] that does not rely on the use of a stirring device is the band-
limited gaussian noise or frequency stirred method. The principle of the method is to
use gaussian band-limited noise to modulate the radiated carrier frequency when
illuminating the test object. The radiated signal excites many modes over the
bandwidth of the noise source in the test object to create a real-time, homogeneous
field distribution. In contrast, mode-stirring creates a time averaged, homogeneous
field distribution by using a mechanical stirrer and statistics. The result of frequency
stirring provides the average power distribution in a cavity and is approximately the
same as the mode-stirred average transfer function. This methodology may find use in
statistically accessing the fields for those frequencies and geometries not suitable for
mode-stirred methods. Frequency stirring is finding development in reverberation
chamber work, and has recently been applied to attenuation tests and does hold some
promise.
As with the assessment of analysis methods, several issues are paramount with regard
to the acquisition and interpretation of HIRF attenuation data. It is evident that different
techniques apply to different experimental situations and airframe configurations. No
single method provides a global HIRF attenuation evaluation of the aircraft. While
mode stirring is superior to LLSCW spatial mapping of the fields in cavities of sufficient
size and excited modal density, it is limited by the size of the stirring paddle and the
associated frequency range for which the stirrer is functional. LLSCW or possibly
frequency stirring techniques are alternatives that may be required for low level
evaluation of, e.g. an engine cowl. Furthermore, as illustrated with the LLDD test
method, a combination of test and analysis may be required to evaluate the HIRF
attenuation for a particular configuration.
5.2 Low Level Swept Frequency Test Compared to Mode-Stirred Test
The above brief description of LLSCW and LLMS test methodologies gives the
essential characteristics of the two test techniques. Figure 5-5 shows swept frequency
data and mode-stirred data on the same plot for measurements between 9.5 and 10.5
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GHz as performed on an airframe testbed flight deck. The swept frequency data is
bounded by the mode stirred minimum and maximum attenuation across the band of
frequencies and varies on average about the stirred mean. This is typical for measured
responses above one GHz and except for isolated frequency intervals involving
dominant modes, also represents the response between 400 MHz and 1 GHz. Mode-
stirred test statistics provide auxiliary information on the attenuation properties of an
aircraft cavity. In addition, experience with the two test methods suggests the following
comparison.
Mode-stirred test times per frequency point are comparable to those for swept
frequency tests. However, as can be seen from Figures 5-6 to 5-9, mode stirring is less
sensitive to receive antenna polarization and position than the swept frequency method
especially above one to two GHz. Figure 5-6 is a swept frequency measurement in
which the receive antenna is displaced from its default position by 2.5 and 5 cm
respectively. The response is seen to be position dependent. Figure 5-7 is an average
mode-stirred measurement in which the receive antenna has been displaced several
feet. The position dependence is not evident especially when distribution functions
from data obtained at two different locations are compared. A similar conclusion can
be drawn from Figures 5-8 and 5-9 which compare typical responses with the receive
antenna polarization changed. To statistically access the equivalent data (i.e.
determine minimum and average attenuation in the cavity at the specified frequency)
with frequency swept methods would require position mapping of the cavity attenuation
properties in addition to changing the antenna polarization. Such test procedures
increase test time significantly.
Mode-stirring tests generally exhibit superior repeatability characteristics over time and
lower data variability than swept frequency methods. More importantly, however,
preliminary calculations indicate they present a test configuration that approximates the
internal environment that evolves when a moving aircraft is exposed to HIRF.
Two limitations associated with using mode-stirred techniques on an aircraft include
accessibility in certain test configurations, and measurements in the vicinity of walls.
HIRF testing within, e.g. engine nacelles, is challenging using mode stirred methods for
two reasons. First, fitting a suitable stirrer and antenna within such a cavity may not be
possible. The stirrer must have dimensions on the order of half the longest test
wavelength of interest. For alternative test configurations, this may restrict the use of
mode stirring to frequencies well above one GHz. The second limitation is a
consequence of requiring the receive antenna to be at least a third of a wavelength
from the cavity walls. Wire bundles or other equipment within or near the walls would
be outside the purview of mode-stirring methodology except for the highest
frequencies, e.g. above 6 GHz.
Finally, one issue not fully resolved is the choice of the Figure of merit to represent
airframe attenuation from the mode-stirred data base, that is, the average versus the
minimum attenuation. Choosing the minimum attenuation would further compound the
sequencing of worst case requirements. Such a choice is not necessarily well founded
in that these numbers are in the extremes of the corresponding attenuation distribution.
It is apparent that until each factor contributing to the HIRF threat is rationally
determined beginning with the environment definition down to equipment level
susceptibilities, the choice will remain problematic.
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5.3 Cavity Mode Distribution Statistics
There has been considerable activity in recent years investigating the modal structure
of complex cavities as excited by incident electromagnetic waves. A deterministic
analysis of the cavity mode distribution is difficult except for the simplest geometries,
i.e., spherical, cylindrical, and rectangular cavities. Consequently, non-deterministic or
statistical approaches have been implemented to investigate those cavities and
frequency ranges for which the mode density is sufficiently high, and for which loss
mechanisms are present but do not overdamp the modal structure. Current theories
indicate that for complex cavities and high mode densities, the power measured at a
randomly selected point has a statistical distribution that is independent of the detailed
geometry of the cavity. If this is the case, then similarity principles can be used to
correlate the response of an LRU in a mode-stirred chamber with the statistically
analogous internal field within an airframe cavity. This may resolve the current
conundrum of relating laboratory susceptibility measurements to airframe internal field
response functions, at least for continuous excitation. The question of pulse excitation
remains open, however.
A modal description of a cavity is useful for assessing possible interactions with
internal electronics and wiring, the field levels within a cavity and their distributions,
interpreting low level continuous wave or mode stirred test results, and in relating
frequency and spatial averaging of the fields within the cavity.
•'A statistical analysis of cavity electromagnetic response data provides a number of
useful insights. First of all it is a method for sorting and evaluating the large and highly
variable data base presented by swept frequency and mode-stirred tests. This method
affords a means of comparing airframe attenuation statistics with reverberation
chamber and theoretical cavity models. Random sampling from an empirically
determined distribution provides with some level of confidence a possible cavity
response. Consequently, should theoretical models match experimental distributions,
they contribute a predictive tool to assess airframe attenuation. Furthermore, an
analysis of the distribution functions may establish a relationship between frequency
and spatial averaging procedures. This is particularly important to mode-stirring test
interpretation where a statistical relationship exists between the mode-stirred response
distribution and a spatial map of the cavity fields.
Historically speaking, early attempts to model cavity resonance distributions can be
found in the work of H. Weyl in his investigations of the electromagnetic mode density
within a rectangular cavity. Recent research specifically directed to modeling the
modal distribution functions for complex cavities of arbitrary shape includes papers by
Miller and Lehman [6], Avallo, et. al., [5], Kostas and Bovarie [7], Lehman [8], Price, et
al,. [9], and Holland and St. John [10]. The following will summarize the most important
of these models, their assumptions, limitations, and predictive aspects, and how they
can be applied to assess HIRF levels in aircraft cavities.
5.3.1 Theoretical Distributions
Current statistical theories addressing the excitation of electromagnetic modes within
complex cavities are based on four principal assumptions:
(1) The cavity is electrically large so the mode density is high.
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(2) The cavity does not have apertures.
(3) The cavity is of complex shape for sufficient randomization of the fields.
(4) The cavity is Iossy but has well defined resonances with reasonably large
resonant Q values.
Within the context of these assumptions Lehman and others have derived probability
density functions for the power loss distribution within a complex cavity. The power
loss, p, is defined to be the ratio of the square of the internal field to the square of the
external field without the airplane present (figure 5-1). The conventional theory for the
cavity mode distribution at a fixed excitation frequency yields a chi square of two
degrees of freedom. In a mode-stirred experiment this would correspond to the fields
measured over one paddle revolution and would represent a temporally derived spatial
distribution. When transformed to power units in dBm their result becomes:
fp(p) = (1/13) z(p) ez{p)
z(p) = eEm-_" d
p = power loss (dBm) /2 = average power loss (dBm)
13= 10/In(10) = 4.343 y = 0.5772... = Euler's Constant
This is the simplest version of the statistical theories, nevertheless it illustrates most
properties of the theoretical distributions and has been applied "with some success to
power loss distributions in reverberation chambers And airframe electronics bay -- ....
cavities. It is a single parameter distribution requiring only the mean cavity energy
density at a given frequency or over a frequency interval.
5.3.2 Theoretical Statistical Analyses
Limitations to the applicability of the above distribution to evaluating airframe
attenuation to HIRF include the assumptions of no apertures and high modal density.
Regarding the latter assumption, it is expected that experiment and theory will
converge at higher frequencies as the cavity modal density (modes per unit volume)
increases with the third power of frequency. At lower frequencies, determined by the
ratio of the cavity dimensions to wavelength, e.g. 400 MHz to 1 GHz in an airframe
electronics bay, corrections to the theoretical distribution incorporating higher statistical
moments will be required. Such a theory has not as yet been developed.
An essential ingredient to a fully developed airframe model must include the effects of
apertures. Whereas the complex cavity assumptions of Lehman and others explicitly
neglects apertures in assessing a distribution function for cavity fields, to do so would
comprise incorporating the respective conditional probabilities to evaluate internal field
distributions as excited by an external source. At high frequencies model distributions
fit empirical distributions regardless of apertures. General criteria for this observation
have not been developed since the correlation must break down for apertures having
sufficiently large cross sections compared to cavity total area. Furthermore, although
theoretical models converge to the chi square distribution, other model distributions
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have been proposed [9,10] and arguments presented for their validity. The issue is not
resolved.
5.4 Cavity Mode Distribution Experimental Results
Determining the statistical distributions for LLSCW or LLMS data reveal trends not
apparent from raw data sets. Statistical distributions are an alternative means for
comparing highly variable and complex HIRF attenuation data sets for other possible
test configurations. In addition, the efficacy of statistical model predictions can be
assessed from these data sets as a function of frequency and test configuration.
Mode-stirring experiments are particularly suited to evaluating the statistical properties
of complex cavities. The collection and interpretation of mode-stirred data is
fundamentally a statistical procedure. Stipulations that fields in a mode-stirred
environment are uniformly distributed, or that measured response functions are
independent of receive antenna polarization or position, are predicated on a statistical
assessment of the data at a fixed frequency or over a frequency interval. As the stirrer
revolves through one cycle, the field measured at an arbitrary point in the cavity
(sufficiently removed from the walls) ranges over the possible amplitudes and phases
of modes that are excited in the cavity at the excitation frequency.
In the statistical sense, and within certain uniformity bounds, a field mapping of the
cavity is determined at a single receive antenna position. For this to be true, it is
required that the cavity be electrically large compared to the excitation wavelength to
ensure that a sufficient number of modes are excited; the cavity must support relatively
high Q resonances so that the mode density is comprised of distinct, albeit effectively
broadened modes. These are criteria for which the above statistical analysis is
deemed to be valid.
Mode-stirring attenuation tests have been performed on a non-production forward
fuselage testbed in part to verify the above assertions. Measurements were made with
the test configuration shown in Figure 5-3. Results are for mode-stirred transfer
function tests performed on a stripped electromagnetically shiny flight deck referenced
to an external open field measurement performed with the airframe removed. The flight
deck is not a completely closed cavity in that window apertures are present. The test
configuration is representative of a possible airframe HIRF attenuation evaluation set-
up. However for the reasons discussed above, the magnitude of the transfer function
data is only approximate. These tests in part validated mode-stirring as a methodology
for assessing airframe attenuation. The following results will illustrate several of the
assertions made above concerning the statistical field distributions within the airframe
cavity.
Figures 5-5 and 5-10 are typical mode-stirred measurements between 9.5 and 10.5
GHz and between 0.5 and 1.0 GHz respectively. The maximum, mean, and minimum
attenuation are calculated at each measured frequency in the band. Figures 5-11 and
5-12 represent the probability density and cumulative probability curves for a single
paddle revolution measurement at 9.75 GHz compared to the above theoretical
prediction. The chi square goodness of fit test is satisfied to the ninety-nine percentile
indicating the model distribution matches at these high frequencies regardless of the
presence of cavity apertures (in this case windows of dimensions larger than a
wavelength). The model distribution function does not fit the data as well at lower
frequencies indicating higher order moments to the distribution may be required to
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obtain a suitable fit or another model formulated. Figures 5-13 and 5-14 compare the
respective distributions at 0.901263 GHz where it is evident the goodness of fit tests
are not satisfied.
Several factors contribute to the observed differences between fits at high and low
frequencies. The two most important concern the increase in modal density with
frequency and the attendant increase in effective Q values with frequency. For a
rectangular cavity the mode density (modes per unit volume) increases proportionally
with the cube of the frequency. A similar functional relationship can be shown to be
true for the complex cavity examined here. Furthermore, Figure 5-15 is a plot of the
average experimental Q determined from resonance structure between 1 and 18 GHz.
This function increases with the square root of the frequency. Criteria for the validity of
the rudimentary single parameter model distribution are met with the increase in
frequency, however it is also apparent that below several GHz the statistical theory is
not adequate and must be extended. Similar conclusions can be drawn for mode-
stirred data representing polarization and position independence which is again verified
with the increase in frequency and consequent statistical field uniformity.
5.5 Implications of Coupling Test and Analysis
A number of challenges exist in using test and analysis to determine the HIRF
compliance of an aircraft.
First it is essential that the assumptions that determine equipment level susceptibility
requirements have a rational basis with regards to the HIRF threat. As discussed in
section 6, specifications have been set either arbitrarily or with respect to a worst case
HIRF environment definition. Consequently, present airframe attenuation requirements
combined with equipment susceptibility requirements tend to compound the required
airframe attenuation requirements and drive overdesign of the aircraft and, it follows,
weight and cost.
Second, different airframe test configurations, e.g. flight deck versus engine cowl, will
demand alternative test techniques to assess attenuation. Evaluating airframe
attenuation with mode-stirring or narrow band gaussian noise techniques and the
attendant statistics may be methods of choice over the 400 MHz to 18 GHz frequency
range where mode densities are high. However, LLSCW or narrow band gaussian
noise techniques may be required in configurations or frequencies not accessible to the
mode-stirring methodology either because of spatial restrictions (no room for a stirrer),
or too low a mode density.
Third, several options are available for expressing the fields in the internal environment
and the respective attenuation. The fields may be referenced to either a calculated or
measured open field value. Disadvantages of the latter scheme are related to the
incorporation of extraneous environmental sources such as ground reflections which
create false resonance structure, and there are inaccuracies associated with the former
procedure. Airframe manufacturers typically reference internal fields to an externally
measured open field with extraneous contributions such as ground reflections
smoothed or factored out.
It should be recognized that attenuation is a conceptually complex quantity that
depends on the conditions and assumptions used in its evaluation. The spatial
variability of attenuation measurements reveal it is not, however, a single number .#
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indicative of an aircraft's ability to shield against HIRF. Both deterministic and
statistical methods should be used to assess airframe attenuation. Deterministic
methods may bound the threat in localized configurations, whereas statistical methods
give a global assessment of the aircraft response to the external threat. Contrary to the
assumptions of past analyses, a consistent HIRF certification process should
incorporate a Figure of merit based in part on the statistical assessment of the HIRF
attenuation response of an aircraft.
In summary, conclusions regarding how test and analysis that assess aircraft coupling
of external HIRF to the internal electromagnetic environment which may provide a more
reasonable HIRF certification process include:
Test:
.
.
.
°
The test method selected depends on the properties of the test
configuration, and the frequency range. For example, LLSCW or
frequency stirring may be chosen for testing within engine nacelles where
spatial dimensions would prohibit effective mode-stirring except for the
very highest frequencies. Mode-stirring or frequency stirring have
attributes that would be advantageous in larger airframe cavities such as
the electronics bay or flight deck in assessing airframe attenuation.
Stirring methodologies may also provide a consistent statistical
assessment of the cavity fields that both approximates the dynamics of
the fly-by fields and the field distributions without the need to perform field
mapping. The latter would be required using LLSCW methods to obtain
equivalent data. Non-stirred LLSCW field mapping tests are time
consuming, expensive, and useful only if appropriately performed in
conjunction with modeling efforts so as to give a representation of the
expected field distribution. .
Full HIRF threat level aircraft tests are expensive, inadequate in their
spatial and (for the forseeable future) frequency coverage, therefore it is
advantageous to the manufacturer they be avoided.
A consistent attenuation assessrnent is possible if suitably characterized
reference and receive antennas are chosen. It is recommended that low
level tests be referenced with respect to low directivity antennas. A
consistent process will incorporate a standardized method for establishing
a reference. Based on the somewhat homogeneous response of the
receive sensor within a complex airframe cavity, the corresponding
directionality of the reference measurement must be factored into the
attenuation, and spurious ground reflection effects and effects of
responses of test configuration elements, identified and removed.
Fly-by tests of HIRF transmitters by production aircraft would provide data
needed to validate code and test methods simulating external to internal
coupling dynamics and thereby contribute to a rational basis for
assessing attenuation requirements. Such tests would potentially verify
the hypothesis that the internal fields excited by a HIRF source
approximates a mode-stirred environment.
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Analytical and Statistical Models:
. Analytical models are important to interpret test data and predict aircraft
response to HIRF. No current methodology can provide a comprehensive
aircraft model, although alternative techniques may be necessary to
assess various component or configuration response functions over
appropriate frequency intervals. Analysis and the corresponding codes
require further validation.
, Test data is inherently sensitive to position within the airframe. Most
analytical methods are deterministic and may only give a qualitative
representation of aircraft response functions in certain frequency ranges.
Statistical approaches are needed to assess field variability, to interpret
mode-stirred test data, and to assess shielding effectiveness as predicted
by complex cavity field distribution functions. The applicablity of statistics
should be delimited.
. Statistical models need to be improved to incorporate the frequency
dependence of the complex cavity mode density function and thereby
provide more realistic models at lower frequencies.
, The overall usefulness of models is in their ability to assess the potential
coupling of the external HIRF environment to internal component
electronics. They will in turn provide a consistent representation of the
external to internal response thereby impacting the formulation of more
realistic equipment level susceptibility and airframe attenuation test
requirements. Probabilistic approaches can provide a means to assess
the overall HIRF threat and thereby provide a rational basis on which to
construct realistic requirements. For example, as mentioned above, it is
significant that third generation airplanes are in operation with fly by wire
engine controls tested to 20 v/m, well below the HIRF environment less a
reasonable assumption for airplane attenuation, yet no incidents have
been reported. The threat can be partitioned into somewhat independent
or conditionally dependent factors including:
1) the probability of encountering the external HIRF environment (threat)
2) the external to internal aircraft coupling
3) the internal environment and the probability of coupling to equipment
4) the probability of system upset
Given sufficient statistical information it is possible to formulate probability
distribution functions for each aforementioned factor that when
appropriately convolved, yield a more realistic assessment of the HIRF
threat. Such an analysis, routine to reliability studies, is predicated on
acquiring accurate distribution functions. As these distributions become
empirically or analytically defined [1], a statistical course of action is
recommended to contribute to the development of more realistic HIRF
requirements, and it follows, a consistent certification process.
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Figure 5-5 Stirred (Solid) Vs Non-Stirred (Dash) Attenuation
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6.0 EQUIPMENT SUSCEPTIBILITY, TEST METHODS, AND
REQUIREMENTS
As discussed in section 3, the FAA and JAA have instituted somewhat different airplane
certification requirements for both equipment level qualification tests and airplane
certification tests. The rationale for this is to a large degree historical, although there is
also a technical basis for some of the dissimilarity. Ongoing coordination continues
between the regulatory agencies to arrive at a single certification process. Such a
comprehensive process definition has not been completed, consequently airplane
manufacturers have often elected to test at higher field levels and requirements
indicative of the JAA process. This assures compliance albeit usually with a cost and
time penalty.
Also discussed in section 3 was the fact that in the realistic process flow, equipment
level requirements and qualification tests are set early in an airplane program so that
the likelihood of compliance for the final integrated systems or airplane test is high.
Nevertheless, significant questions remain concerning the bench level test
methodology and attendant requirements. These have been based on somewhat
problematic assumptions, and it is yet to be shown that these are consistent with the
actual internal airplane environment. The combination of the external environment
levels and the choice of bench level test requirements set the airframe attenuation
requirements. Choosing a worst case scenario for the environment, and somewhat
arbitrary equipment test levels have driven requirements for airframe attenuation to
levels that may not b_ realizable at certain threat frequencies. This then requires
possible excessive additional equipment level shielding and the attendant weight
penalty.
The process is not rational in view of the history of the HIRF threat, or in view of the
basic assumption of equipment level vulnerability. Laboratory tests to date have shown
that for frequencies above 1 GHz, at which the external environment is most severe,
current equipment designs do not respond in those cases for which the equipment
functions below 1 GHz. Figures 6-1 to 6-2 provide overviews to pulsed and AM
equipment under test (EUT) susceptibilities as a function of frequency.
Questions remain, therefore, as to the means of assessing equipment or integrated
systems that will simulate the actual response in the airframe internal environment.
Current screen room test levels, e. g., 100, or 200 vim below 400 MHz, and 600 vim
above 400 MHz have been set either on the basis of historical (often military standard)
levels, estimated airframe attenuation levels, and the capabilities of available test
facilities. Furthermore, test methodologies used in anechoic versus mode-stirred
chambers yield results that are difficult to relate to each other and to evaluate with
current modeling techniques. The following section will discuss the challenges
presented by susceptibility tests and the assumptions that have made a consistent
certification process difficult to achieve.
6.1 Bench Level Test Procedures Assessment
Historically, HIRF equipment has been selected and sub-system laboratory tests have
been performed using test procedures and test configurations that are consistent with
DO-160C, Section 20. Figure 6-3 is a schematic representing the process by which
equipment level test and analysis is formulated. The testing is conducted in shield
rooms or anechoic chambers on individual LRUs with simulated loads. More recently,
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an attempt has been made to make the LRU test setup so that installation details, such
as grounding, wire harness shielding, shield terminations, and equipment interfaces are
consistent with the actual airplane installation.
An example of an equipment level test is shown in Figure 6-4. The system is setup in a
shield room with anechoic absorber. The system setup, system procedures and
capabilities, mode change description, and antenna positions/polarizations are
explained within the supplier's qualification test plan (QTP). All transmit antenna
positions and polarizations are centered and placed at one meter from the equipment
under test (EUT).
In this particular example, during testing at each of the RF susceptibility discrete
frequencies, the supplier's automated test equipment (ATE) is sequentially monitoring
up to 15 input/output channels for either audio communications distortion, audio power
output, or audio noise without signal, depending on the RF modulation type. A
susceptible response is indicated automatically by the ATE when the appropriate data
gathering mode is selected. In order for the ATE to capture any susceptibility, the
setup is radiated at a test level for a minimum dwell time of 30 seconds. Any failures
are automatically highlighted on a monitoring CRT by the ATE. Personnel continuously
monitor the ATE for any such indications.
The RF susceptibility pass/fail criteria is provided by the supplier's representatives.
During the RF testing, the supplier's personnel monitor the test system for upsets and
provide the mode switching at each of the required RF test frequencies.
This is the common susceptibility test scenario and is advocated since practicalities
and logistics drive this type of testing. Analogous to lightning susceptibility
certification, HIRF is also difficult to simulate at full threat levels. Certification tests are
therefore broken down into components. For the LRU tests a fixed voltage and current
are specified and then sufficient shielding, cable routing, etc., is guaranteed by the
airframe manufacturer to make sure the energy at the LRU (line replaceable unit) does
not exceed this level.
Bench level tests may not simulate accurately the actual in-airplane environment but
may be justified by means of a measure of electromagnetic hardness. This mode of
certification can be maintained until on-going research and development efforts
produce accurate modeling methods to predict internal airplane levels as a function of
the external threat.
6.2 Compliance Using System-Level TestingVersus Equipment-Level
Testing
A definition of system-level test is one in which qualified equipment have been
integrated into a system to be tested at the appropriate susceptibility levels. Few
system tests are actually performed because system integration usually occurs late in
an airplane program. Although systems comprised of qualified equipment are at lower
risk of test failure, such a system test where a failure occurred could have
unacceptable consequences. Meaningful full-up system integration rarely occurs early
enough for system level tests to be performed in a timely manner. This becomes a
driving factor for the LRU equipment testing using simulated loads. There simply may
be no chance of getting a full system for HIRF certification. Furthermore, systems tend
to be physically large and electronically complex for which there are few test facilities of
67
dimensions sufficient to radiate the system under test. Indeed, making the system
operational outside the airplane itself may not be feasible thus limiting the types of
systems available for test in any case.
One example of a system level test is the electronic engine controller or EEC. Figure
6-5 shows a block diagram of the EEC test setup. The EEC is housed inside ascreen
room, over a copper ground plane with on-engine devices (e.g., actuators, sensors,
ignitors, etc.) tied to the ground plane through ground straps or through mounting bolts
of on-engine devices, or to the low side of circuits simulating engine loads. The EEC
itself is tied to the ground plane with a copper strap. The objective is to recreate the
engine ground plane where possible. For this test, the aircraft interface cables under
test (channel A and B) are supplied by the airframe manufacturer and the shields
terminated at each connector with pigtails. The supplier monitors the position of engine
actuators to determine EEC susceptibility to EMI or lighting induced transients. The
positions of the actuators are determined by linear potentiometers linked to the moving
parts of the actuators. The potentiometer signals are routed to a strip chart recorder
through copper conduit. The EEC manufacturer test bench allows the EEC to operate
in closed loop engine control at a particular operation point.
There has been expressed a concern on the part of the JAA that insufficient full HIRF
system level tests are performed and they are conveying a strong desire for such tests
to be done. However, there is no indication that the current approach to certification
will change in the near future. Systems are becoming more complex and although this
may drive the need for system tests, the complexity will increase the logistical
difficulties. Furthermore, revision of requirements to accommodate system tests have
yet to be established. The HIRF user's guide does describe tests using a systems rig;
however, a comparable document to DO-160 for equipment tests has not been written.
There are no well developed models to predict shielding of components or systems.
The only concrete points available are based on test results. Models are needed to
predict field levels in, for example, the EE bay. Models and tests are even more limited
for system tests. There is a need to establish a baseline and the conditions and
circumstances where system level testing is absolutely required. This does not exist at
the present time. Furthermore, LRUs are tested on the bench in a variety of states to
simulate the system. In addition, modeling indicates that the wiring responds only to
the local fields. The present method of equipment testing tends to be conservative,
because susceptibility test levels below 400 MHz are typically at or above the HIRF
threat environment without the benefit of shielding by the airframe racks, and the
airframe itself.
The trade offs in performing LRU versus system level tests are significant. System
tests require larger test facilities capable of achieving at least equivalent test fields and
are therefore energy intensive. Few facilities are operational that can achieve the
required high field levels with full system test rigs in place. Furthermore, it would be
unrealistic to immerse a system having a large geometry in a uniform field.
Requirements also become more demanding to perform tests which in all likelihood will
include both manufacturer and supplier test personnel. The benefits of performing
system tests may not justify the expense.
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6.3 Assess Internal Field Baseline and Susceptibility Models
A significant issue central to developing an overall consistent certification process, is
the relationship between the shield room test and the airplane internal HIRF
environment. A typical scenario in performing airplane attenuation tests is to measure
the electric field at the center of the cavity and then apply the attenuation to the
requirements for radiated susceptibility to calculate the levels the equipment can
withstand. This procedure represents a very conservative approach for several
reasons. First, the electric fields are typically measured in the center of the cavity or
away from the metal which neglects the shielding effects of the equipment racks.
Bench level testing measures the total field on the bench due to the sum of both the
transmit antenna and reflections from the environment. Therefore the drive level does
not represent an incident plane wave field on the equipment under test (EUT). If the
receive probe happens to be located at a null due to a wall reflection, the power is
increased until the required field level is attained, which in some cases is not
achievable.
A possible resolution of these difficulties is to use mode-stirring for both equipment
level testing and airframe attenuation assessment. As discussed in section 5, should
chamber and airframe cavity statistical distribution functions prove to be the same,
similarity arguments can be made to relate the LRU response in these two
environments [19]. That is, the mode-stirred chamber results may prove to be more
representative of the airframe cavity environment. Mode-stirring has the additional
advantage of producing higher field levels for a given input power than traditional
screen room techniques.
Resolution of the internal environment problem can in principle be obtained from a
combination of test and modeling of the equipment level test environment, in
comparison with the HIRF internal environment. However, limited progress has been
accomplished in modeling bench or system level tests or for that matter, airplane
cavities. Recent attempts [16-19] give promising results for representing the fields
within electrically large cavities driven by externally excited apertures. Furthermore,
statistical models [5-11] also make contributions to the internal field assessment by
providing trends and bounds to the cavity RF coupling.
As shown in Figure 5-2, LLSCW test data taken on a bare airframe cavity indicates that
above 200 MHz, the internal environment behaves as a resonant enclosure containing
a high density of excited modes. Simple analytical models of Iossy cavities support this
assertion. Figure 6-6 represents the modal structure within a Iossy cavity excited by an
internally positioned point dipole compared to LLCW test data. It is evident that there
is qualitative agreement. The model may be overly simple to describe a real airframe
cavity in detail, nonetheless it does support a conclusion brought out by the statistical
analysis of the excitation of electromagnetic waves in complex cavities. There it has
been shown that the distribution function for the modes within electrically large complex
cavities is largely independent of the detailed geometry of the cavity.
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There are unresolved questions that models need to address. An important problem
concerns the antenna response and calibration [20-22] within a shield room or
reverberation chamber as compared to the response within the airplane cavity. The
calibration factor for a reverberation chamber is defined as [21]:
m = PD/PT
Po= c <U> = Power density
where PT= Net energy transmitted
c = Speed of light
<U> = Average energy density
The power density can be measured as a function of frequency inside the room. The
received power is:
P = <A> P
r O
<A> = Average effective area
The effective area (A) of an antenna is defined as:
A= pqq D X2 / (4 x)
where
P
q
q
D
is the polarization mismatch factor,
is the impedance mismatch factor,
is the antenna efficiency,
is the antenna directivity,
is the free space wavelength.
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The directivity, when averaged over all incident angles(<D>), is 1, where <> indicates
an average over 4 = steradians. The effective area <A> is then:
<A> 2
=pqq<D>;L /(4=)
2
= pq rl _. /(4_)
Using a polarization mismatch factor of 1/2 and a directivity of one, the calibration
factor becomes:
m = P/(<A> PT) = l/(qq) 8 =/;L2 Pr/P.r
There is a contention that empirical evidence indicates the above calibration factor is a
factor of 2 too large. Without an answer to this question, the relationship between
shield room susceptibility measurements and airplane internal field measurements
remains unresolved. In other words, the correspondence between the field at the
equipment under test in a shield room or reverberation chamber, and the field at the
equipment located in the airplane cavity must be demonstrated. The answer to this
question is a function of the antenna response in each of these environments.
Figure 6-7 provides a partial answer to this difficulty. The graph shows the respective
transfer functions within the test bed flight deck for a monopole over a ground plane
antenna compared with a directional horn antenna. Each has been respectively
referenced to its open field measurement. The open field directivities of these two
antennas differ on the average by 10 dB over the frequency range of interest. Figure
6-8 compares the two antenna airframe transfer functions after the corresponding open
field references have been removed. Much of the directivity difference has been lost
within the complex cavity; that is, the antenna response approaches isotropy.
This observation suggests the following argument for assessing the correct antenna
calibration in the cavity environment [21-22]. Given that the antenna inside the
airframe responds isotropically, then the appropriate reference for an internal airframe
attenuation is an isotropic reference. The isotropic reference can either be measured
or calculated.
The polarization mismatch factor for a randomly polarized wave incident on the
antenna is 1/2 [22]. This is a result of the antenna coupling to only half the cavity
energy. The other half of the cavity energy is cross polarized to the receive antenna.
The average effective area is now
2
<A> = q q ;L /(8=)
The efficiency (n) and the impedance mismatch factor (q) limit the repeatability of a
transfer function measurement made with two differing antennas. The impedance
mismatch factor is given as:
2
q=l -p
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where p = the reflection coefficient.
p = (VSWR -1 )/(VSWR +1 )
where VSWR is the voltage standing wave ratio. This quantity varies between
antennas as a function of frequency and accounts for much of the variability (along with
the secondary efficiency differences n) in transfer function measurements when using
different antennas. In principle, the references can be calculated for different antennas
using empirically determined antenna directivities, however these vary due to
measurement inaccuracies. Therefore, a calculated reference may not yet be accurate
enough for attenuation measurements since a few dB error in the attenuation may
impact design.
An alternative to a calculated reference is to measure the transfer function with a low
directivity antenna, such as an electrically small dipole (D= 1.8 dBi). This would
minimize the effects of antenna directivity while not requiring any post processing of the
data, and thereby provide a consistent picture of the airframe internal environment.
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
HIRF aircraft attenuation requirements are based on worst case external HIRF threat
levels and somewhat arbitrarily determined equipment level susceptibility requirements.
A consistent certification process requires several currently missing elements. First, a
uniform definition of the HIRF environment that incorporates factors that affect the
probability of encountering this environment is essential. Second, equipment level
susceptibility tests requirements should be determined that are consistent with internal
HIRF structure as assessed from test and analysis. Arbitrarily set standards should be
revised. This will demand a combination of deterministic and statistical analyses to
assess the component response to the highly variable fields excited within the aircraft
by the external HIRF environment. Finally, a consistent aircraft response to the
external field should be assessed by taking the ratio of a statistical or deterministic
internal field measurement with respect to an operationally established reference field
measurement.
7.1 Certification Process
Comparing the idealized commercial aircraft HIRF certification process as detailed in
the AC-20xx Users Manual to the realistic process as practiced by a commercial
airframe manufacturer, the following differences have been noted:
The realistic process is one in which test and analysis, requirements negotiation,
equipment susceptibility qualification among other processes evolve in parallel. There
is no recursive corrections loop at the end of a program in the realistic process as
indicated for the idealized process. However there is the possibility of post-certification
testing.
The importance of new test technology and modeling breakthroughs to assess airframe
and component qualification is given more emphasis in the realistic process.
Generic airframe curves provided in the Users Manual as they are now formulated have
been of limited usefulness in the realistic process. The concept, however, if developed
for Level A, B, and C systems may simplify the overall process to certification which is a
goal of formulating a consistent compliance process.
7.2 External HIRF Environment
The external HIRF environment is established by the distribution of worst case emitters
as a function of frequency. Assessing the environment is ongoing. Incorporating
additional factors such as transmitter antenna system losses, antenna structure
heights, restricted airspace, and evaluating airport driver emitter location, will provide
for a more realistic threat. Current probability based models for the HIRF threat are
primitive and need to be improved. Their use for incorporating the probability of
exposure into evaluating HIRF test requirements should be established.
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7.3 Aircraft Coupling/Internal Environment
The test method selected to evaluate airframe attenuation depends on the properties of
the test configuration, and the frequency regime. For example, LLSCW or frequency
stirring may be chosen for testing within engine nacelles where spatial dimensions
would prohibit effective mode-stirring except for the very highest frequencies. Mode-
stirring or frequency stirring have attributes that would be advantageous in assessing
airframe attenuation in larger airframe cavities such as the electronics bay or flight
deck. These test methodologies at the higher frequencies provide a consistent
statistical assessment of the cavity fields without the need to perform field mapping as
would be required using LLSCW methods to obtain equivalent data. Non-stirred
LLSCW field mapping tests are time consuming, expensive, and useful only if
appropriately performed in conjunction with modeling efforts to give a representation of
the expected field distribution.
A consistent attenuation assessment is possible if suitably characterized reference and
receive antennas are chosen. Low level tests should be referenced with respect to
omnidirectional antennas. A consistent process will incorporate a standardized method
for establishing a reference. Based on the somewhat homogeneous response of the
receive sensor within a complex airframe cavity, the corresponding directivity of the
reference measurement must be factored into the attenuation.
Analytical and numerically based models are important to interpret test data and predict
aircraft response to HIRF and need more emphasis in the certification process. No
current methodology provides a comprehensive aircraft model, although alternative
techniques may be necessary to assess various component or configuration response
functions. Analysis and the corresponding codes require further validation.
Attenuation test data is inherently sensitive to position. Most analytical methods are
deterministic and over certain frequency intervals provide only a qualitative
representation of aircraft response functions. Where applicable, statistical approaches
are needed to assess field variability, to interpret mode-stirred test data, and to assess
shielding effectiveness as predicted by complex cavity field distribution functions.
Statistical models need to be improved to incorporate the frequency dependence of the
complex cavity mode density function and thereby provide more realistic models at
lower frequencies. Limitations to the statistical approach need to be established.
The overall usefulness of models is in their ability to assess the potential coupling of
the external HIRF environment to internal component electronics. The result will
provide a consistent representation of the external to internal response thereby
impacting the formulation of more realistic equipment level susceptibility and airframe
attenuation test requirements.
Probabilistic approaches can provide a means to assess the overall HIRF threat and
thereby provide a global basis on which to construct realistic requirements. As this
paper has indicated, the threat can be partitioned into approximately independent or
conditionally dependent factors including:
1) the probability of encountering the external HIRF environment (threat)
2) the external to internal aircraft coupling
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3) the internal environment and the probability of coupling to equipment
4) the probability of system upset.
7.4 Susceptibility, Test Methods and Requirements
Analogous to lightning, HIRF is a threat that is difficult to full threat simulate.
Certification tests are broken down into components, with a few system level tests
performed. Current bench level testing is more a measure of an equipment's
electromagnetic hardness than a true simulation of the airplane internal environment.
Consequently, qualification test levels are set based on historical precedence,
estimated airframe attenuation, or test laboratory capabilities. Below 400 MHz, test
levels tend to represent a conservative assessment. Above one GHz equipment do
not appear to respond to the simulated threat when no problems are seen below one
GHz. Data should be gathered to determine if this is a general trend.
Few large system tests are performed because system integration occurs late in an
airplane program, and adequate test facilities are limited in capabilities and availability.
The cost effectiveness of performing system tests should be established. Modeling
efforts are not currently adequate to address system response to HIRF, and test results
are limited.
Antenna calibration factors relating airplane internal fields to shield room and
reverberation chamber measurements remain controversial. Empirical data indicates
antennas respond isotropically in complex cavities containing large mode densities.
Statistical models support this conclusion. Additional research is needed to resolve
this issue.
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